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On Nov. 1, the Guatemalan guerrilla organizations, grouped in the umbrella Unidad Revolucionaria
Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG), initiated their first unilateral cease- fire since the civil war began in
1960. The cease-fire, which will last two weeks, is part of a pact signed between the URNG and the
country's political parties to allow the Nov. 12 general elections to proceed in a climate of peace.
The guerrilla endorsement of the elections represents a fundamental turning point in Guatemala's
recent history. It marks the rebels' first concrete step toward laying down their arms and joining the
legal political process. Moreover, it greatly elevates the importance of the elections, the outcome of
which will largely determine how successful the URNG will be in winning economic and political
reforms in the peace negotiations, and how fast a final peace accord will be signed once a new
government takes office.
A total of 20 candidates are registered to participate in the elections, which, in addition to the
presidential and vice-presidential posts, will contest 80 seats in the country's unicameral Congress,
300 of the nation's 330 mayoral offices, and 20 seats in the Central American Parliament (see
NotiSur, 09/29/95).
In the presidential vote, a candidate must receive more than 50% of the valid ballots cast to win in
the first round, otherwise a runoff election will be held on Dec. 7 between the two front-runners.
The winner will take office on Jan. 13, 1996, for a four-year term. In the legislative elections, 64 of the
80 congressional seats will be elected from the country's 22 departments and from the municipality
of Guatemala. The other 16 will be selected from a national list in a complex procedure based on a
proportional vote. This method allows some of the smaller parties to win congressional seats even if
they are unable to muster enough votes in a specific geographical area.
The 20 representatives to the Central American Parliament will also be elected from a national
list. The Parliament deputies, however, will serve five-year terms, while the National Congress
representatives will be elected for four years. More voters will be eligible to cast ballots in these
elections than in any other previous electoral process. About 3.7 million people are registered to
vote, representing about 73% of the voting-age population.
In the 1990 presidential elections, only 2.5 million people were registered to vote, meaning that some
1.2 million more people of voting age have been registered since then. The rate of abstention is
expected to drop compared with other recent electoral processes. Abstention had reached alarming
levels the last two times that voters were asked to go to the polls. In the January 1994 referendum
to reform the Constitution, a record 84% of the eligible electorate abstained. In the August 1994
legislative elections, nearly 80% of voters failed to cast ballots (see NotiSur, 08/19/94). "The voters
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distrust political leaders," said Feliz Castillo Milla, head of the Civil Registry, which carried out a
major drive to register voters that ended in mid-August. "When they win power they forget their
promises and some are involved in illicit enrichment."
In the Nov. 12 ballot, however, between 55% and 70% of the registered voters are expected to cast
ballots, according to election surveys conducted by both official and independent sources. In fact, a
new survey by the Paradigma polling firm in early November found that 71.6% of the Indian voters
who are registered to vote intend to go to the polls. Abstention has traditionally been the highest in
Indian communities. Indians make up more than half of Guatemala's 10.5 million population. The
expected drop in abstention reflects the unusually high stakes in this election. Virtually all of the
country's social forces are endorsing the process. Influential organizations such as the Rigoberta
Menchu Foundation, the Catholic Church, the Civil Sector Assembly (Asamblea de la Sociedad
Civil, ASC), the National University, and the business elite's Chamber of Agriculture, Commerce,
Industry, and Finance (CACIF) have all launched television, radio, and poster campaigns urging
citizens to vote.
Even the URNG has launched a get-out-the-vote crusade in the local media, marking an
unprecedented turnaround in the guerrilla position regarding elections, which the rebels have
traditionally boycotted since they took up arms. Indeed, the URNG decision to carry out a unilateral,
two-week cease-fire from Nov. 1-13 the first since the war began is a major factor contributing to the
surge in domestic and foreign interest in the elections, which for the first time are seen by all sides
as a legitimate forum for political participation.
Guerrilla truce represents dramatic step to end war
The cease-fire is part of an accord that the URNG signed with the country's principal political
parties last August. That agreement dubbed the "Contadora Declaration" since the rebel leaders
met with politicians on the Panamanian island of Contadora to sign the pact commits the URNG
to cease all offensive military actions during the elections. It binds the rebels, the government, and
political parties to enforce respect for the security of candidates, party activists, electoral officials,
and observers during the campaign. The accord represents a dramatic step forward in the peace
process, since it implicitly commits the guerrillas to accept the legal political framework as the
appropriate battleground to fight for social change in Guatemala.
Moreover, it solidifies the peace negotiations by obligating the country's most important political
parties to respect and endorse all accords signed at the bargaining table, regardless of who wins
the elections. The declaration recognizes all agreements reached in the talks as "accords of state."
"The conditions to sign a peace accord exist in Guatemala, but we want to make sure that at no
time will any party be able to jeopardize signed agreements," said Hector Manuel Klee Orellana,
a deputy in the Central American Parliament who presided over the Contadora talks. "With this
accord, all the major political parties have given their formal endorsement to the peace process and
the agreements achieved therein."
In Guatemala, the accord is widely considered the first concrete indication that the war is
finally coming to an end. All sides now consider the peace process "irreversible." "It's the most
transcendent step to date in the peace talks," said Hector Rosada, head of the government Peace
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Commission (COPAZ). "It shows that not only are we serious about the negotiations, but we are
steadily moving toward an end to the war." Indeed, by endorsing the elections now, the URNG is
preparing the groundwork to enter the country's legal political process sometime after the next
government takes office. According to a lengthy report on the elections by the CERIGUA news
agency an information service sympathetic to the guerrillas that the government has long accused
of having links to the URNG the rebels have two strategic motivations for endorsing the electoral
process.
First, the URNG wants to ensure that the extreme-right Frente Republicano Guatemalteco (FRG)
founded and directed by retired Gen. Efrain Rios Montt will not sweep the elections as happened
in the August 1994 congressional vote. With only 20% of registered voters casting ballots in those
elections, the FRG won 32 of the legislature's 80 seats with the support of only 6% of the electorate.
By boycotting elections and contributing to high levels of abstention, the URNG would only be
favoring a right-wing victory at the polls, which could seriously endanger the future of the peace
process.
Second, the URNG wants grassroots organizations to participate in the elections. By creating space
for popular participation in the process, the URNG hopes that organizations that favor economic
and political reforms crucial to the peace talks will win representation in Congress, giving those
sectors much greater influence in the negotiations. The URNG wants to lay the foundation for its
reincorporation into the political system as a legal movement or party in preparation for the next
scheduled national elections in the year 2000. "The experience of the FMLN in El Salvador has
demonstrated that it is no simple matter to translate the political strengths of a guerrilla front into
those of a political party," read the CERIGUA report, which appeared in the quarterly bulletin
Report on Guatemala. "By giving the green light for participation in 1995, the URNG is offering its
noncombatant cadre and supporters the opportunity to gain experience operating in an electoral
environment."
In fact, as a direct result of the newfound political space created by the peace process, a coalition
of leftist organizations is participating directly in the elections for the first time since the 1954
overthrow of the Jacobo Arbenz government, which ushered in four decades of political polarization
in Guatemala and gave rise to the guerrilla war. The Frente Democratico Nueva Guatemala
(FDNG) is a broad alliance of Mayan, labor, and grassroots organizations that is running about 180
candidates for congressional and mayoral posts around the country. Of the 20 parties registered
in the elections, the FDNG is the only authentic left-wing grouping that is offering an alternative
platform to voters. All the other parties range from center left to extreme right, and they all uphold
the neoliberal economic model of market reforms as their point of departure.
According to FDNG presidential candidate Jorge Gonzales, the party's program calls for: * a tax
reform to increase state income and make the tax system more just; * the implementation of a tax on
fallow land to force the country's large landholders to either bring their property into production or
sell holdings to landless campesinos; * the adoption of most of the social and economic proposals
drawn up by the civil organizations grouped in the ASC; * the "demilitarization" of the country
through legal reforms that would shrink the role of the army; and, * the immediate ratification of all
peace accords with a clear government commitment to enforce those agreements in practice.
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"In Mexico and Argentina they sold off practically everything, and look at the state of their
economies," said Gonzales, who emphasized that the FDNG would forge a government program
that sharply differs from the neoliberal model in vogue throughout the region. "Our platform
presents viable alternatives to protect our national patrimony. The government is under no
obligation to enact neoliberal policies. These are countries that suffer a serious debt problem and
are forced to follow commitments imposed by the IMF and the World Bank. Guatemala isn't in this
situation, and this gives us the flexibility to design socioeconomic policies that are in the interest of
Guatemalans, not just those demanded by orthodox schools of neoliberalism."
The FDNG does not expect to win the presidential race. Rather, its goal is to gain a foothold in
Congress, win as many mayoralties as possible, and begin to develop its potential as a permanent
political movement in the country. It will likely be able to count on substantial support in the Indian
communities of Guatemala's northwest highlands. Of the party's 180 congressional and mayoral
candidates, 137 are Mayan. The FDNG vice-presidential candidate, Juan Leon Alvarado, is also a
Mayan who helped found the Comite de Unidad Campesina (CUC) in 1978. From 1992-1994 he was
director of the Mayan organization Majawil Q'ij (New Dawn). At the time of his nomination, Leon
was the director of Defensoria Maya (Mayan Defense Organization) and coordinator of the Coalition
of Mayan Peoples' Organizations of Guatemala (COPMAGUA).
Presidential race being fought among conservative parties
Meanwhile, as the FDNG tests its electoral strength for the first time, the presidential contest and
much of the legislative and mayoral races are being fought out among the country's established
conservative parties, which lead in the polls. All recent surveys show that Alvaro Arzu, presidential
candidate for the Partido de Avanzada Nacional (PAN), is leading the race, with between 40%
and 50% of voters stating that they will support PAN at the ballot box. Arzu, who ran as PAN's
presidential candidate in 1990 and came in third, is the former mayor of Guatemala City (1986-
1990). His party, which has continued to control the mayor's office in the capital since 1990 and
which currently holds 24 seats in Congress, has benefitted from its image as a "clean" party that has
sincerely fought against the corruption rampant in Guatemala's political system.
Arzu has also attempted to build bridges with progressive groups, especially among urban
intellectuals, which has increased his appeal among voters in the capital and other cities. In part, he
has won support among the urban middle class because his brand of neoliberalism is regarded as
less harsh than that of the extreme right. He proposes to maintain a social safety net for the working
poor, encouraging some groups to dub his platform "neoliberalism under anesthesia."
Moreover, Arzu is widely believed to be the candidate most favored by the "institutionalist" faction
of the army, the US State Department, and outgoing President Ramiro de Leon. Nevertheless,
nobody expects Arzu to win in the first round, although it is unclear which of the other two parties
that are considered the closest runners up will make it to the runoff election. Most recent polls
indicate that the FRG's presidential candidate, Alfonso Portillo, will win between 10% and 17% of
the votes. In third place is Fernando Andrade of the Alianza Nacional, a coalition of three parties
that includes the Democracia Cristiana Guatemalteca (DCG), the Union del Centro Nacional (UCN),
and the Partido Social Democrata (PSD). The Alianza has benefitted from the well-greased party
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machines of the DCG and the UCN, which are the best organized parties in the country and the only
ones that have long-standing party affiliates in all of the country's departments and municipalities.
The Alianza's image, however, is seriously tarnished by the involvement of DCG and UCN officials
in numerous corruption scandals in recent years. In addition, Andrade a career diplomat has proven
to be a lackluster candidate unable to attract much popular enthusiasm on the campaign trail. In
contrast, Portillo has benefitted from the popularity of Rios Montt, the founder of the FRG who was
widely expected to be the party's presidential candidate this year. In July, Rios Montt, who ruled the
country by decree for 18 months in 1982-1983 as head of a de facto military government, was legally
barred from becoming the FRG's candidate because of a constitutional clause that prohibits anyone
who came to power in a coup d'etat from ever again occupying the president's chair (see NotiSur,
08/11/95).
Rios Montt, however, still commands impressive popularity among voters throughout the country,
and until he was eliminated from the race, he had been the front runner in all opinion polls. Now,
the general is actively campaigning for Portillo around the country, presenting a vote for Portillo as
an indirect vote for Rios Montt. Indeed, should Portillo win the presidential race in a second-round
election, Rios Montt would universally be seen as the power behind the thrown.
"Portillo to govern, Rios Montt to rule," has been the FRG's central campaign slogan. As a result,
should Portillo face off against Arzu in a second-round election, the political stakes would grow
significantly, given that a victory by the extreme-right FRG could threaten the advance of the
peace process. Clearly, were the FRG to win the second-round, the incoming government would
resist any significant concessions to the guerrillas at the bargaining table, especially opposing far-
reaching economic and political reforms such as the URNG's efforts to "demilitarize" the country
and improve human rights.
In a chilling reminder of Rios Montt's 18-month dictatorship, for example, Portillo told the Inter
Press Service on Nov. 3 that his government would move to reinstate special judicial tribunals
similar to those established by Rios Montt during his time in office. The secret tribunals were widely
condemned by human rights organizations and governments around the world. "Everybody is
scared by the idea of 'faceless judges'," said Portillo, referring to the use of secret courts in Peru and
Colombia where masked judges have been used to try and sentence guerrillas and others accused
of political crimes. "But the fact is, what other way is there for a judge to impose sentences given
the fear that some group will kill him in reprisal, or maybe kidnap his daughter to pressure him."
Finally, there remains an element of surprise in the elections, given that more than 50% of the
eligible electorate is still "undecided," according to all opinion polls.
For its part, the FDNG is counting on many of the undecided votes, since that party says voters
in the western conflict zones are too afraid to openly voice their support for the FDNG, much
less participate in campaign rallies. A number of large civic committees in the Indian highland
communities have told journalists that it is "too dangerous" for them to publicly endorse the FDNG,
but in private tell their supporters to vote for FDNG presidential candidate Jorge Gonzales. On Nov.
1, Gonzales accused the army of carrying out a campaign of "intimidation and defamation" against
the FDNG. According to Gonzales and other FDNG leaders, army patrols have occupied various
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rural communities, where they destroyed FDNG propaganda and warned local citizens not to vote
for the Frente.
"We demand that the president enforce order among army troops," said Gonzales. "The
government must force army personnel to accept the fact that they are obligated by the Constitution
to stay out of the country's political affairs." [Sources: Report on Guatemala, Guatemala News and
Information Bureau (Oakland, CA), September 1995; Inforpress Centroamericana (Guatemala),
08/03/95, 08/10/95, 08/24/95, 08/31/95, 09/14/95, 10/12/95, 10/14/95, 10/26/95; CERIGUA Weekly News
Briefs (Guatemala), 10/26/95, 10/27/95; Agencia Centroamericana de Noticias-Spanish news service
EFE, 08/21/95, 11/01/95; Notimex, 08/22/95, 11/01/95, 11/03/95; Inter Press Service, 08/24/95, 11/02/95,
11/03/95; Agence France-Presse, 08/19/95, 08/20-22/95, 10/14/95, 10/26/95, 10/31/95, 11/05-08/95;
Reuter, 08/22/95, 11/01/95, 11/03/95, 11/05/95, 11/08/95, 11/09/95]
-- End --
